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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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8 MARCH 1972

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 28 FEBRUARY - 5 MARCH

Moscow (2767 items)

China	(10%)	12%
[Nixon Visit	(5%)	7%]
Luna 20	(6%)	12%
Bangladesh Prime	(--)	9%
Minister Rahman		
in USSR		
Indochina	(10%)	6%

Peking (1500 items)

Domestic Issues	(46%)	43%
Israeli Incursion	(--)	11%
Into Lebanon		
Nixon Visit	(17%)	10%
PRC-Ghana Diplomatic	(--)	4%
Relations Restored		
Indochina	(10%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP

PEKING RESUMES LOW-LEVEL CRITICISM OF U.S. IN WAKE OF VISIT

Amid the crosscurrents of reaction from its allies to President Nixon's visit, Peking has not offered any authoritative comment on U.S. policy while resuming low-level criticism of the United States. There has been no report on the whereabouts of Chou En-lai or of most of the Politburo members since Chou's return to Peking on 29 February after seeing the President off in Shanghai. Among those greeting Chou, only Li Hsien-nien and Li Te-sheng have made reported appearances since. Chang Chun-chiao, the President's host in Shanghai, welcomed Sihanouk to that city on 5 March upon the prince's return from Hanoi. The brief report on Chang's toast at a banquet for Sihanouk did not mention the United States, but one of the slogans shouted at the airport expressed support for the Indochinese "war against U.S. aggression"--the standard formula which had been softened in the joint communique on the President's visit.

Peking carried the joint communique on Sihanouk's Hanoi visit, which contained an allusion to the Sino-U.S. communique, but it has not reported a 4 March editorial by its Pyongyang ally--the only communist capital to have endorsed Peking's invitation to the President--calling the visit "a great victory" for the Chinese and praising them for having maintained their "consistent revolutionary principle." Despite its endorsement of the visit, the North Korean editorial struck a discordant note--to Chinese ears--by attacking the United States for trying to create dissension within the communist movement by continuing its military actions in Vietnam while talking about peace.

Reflecting the strains between Peking and Hanoi arising out of the President's visit, the Chinese avoided citing North Vietnamese comment during the course of the visit, except for pickups of protests against U.S. military actions and reports on the Indochina situation. In the first account of North Vietnamese comment since before the visit, NCNA on 6 March summarized a NHAN DAN editorial of that date hailing the joint communique on Sihanouk's stay in the DRV. But while thus again publicizing Hanoi comment, NCNA omitted the harsher anti-U.S. passages in the editorial, such as its characterization of the United States

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as "the most malicious, stubborn, and dangerous enemy" of mankind and its attacks on the Nixon Doctrine. Predictably, NCNA omitted the editorial's pointed assertion that the Indochinese peoples do not entertain any "illusions" about the true nature of U.S. imperialism.*

PRC COVERAGE OF VISIT In the absence of any direct commentary on the President's visit, Peking has conveyed its stamp of approval both by the triumphal welcome accorded Chou on his return to the capital and by rerunning television coverage of the visit for five days after the President's departure for home. Judging from the behavior of the Canton television station, the decision to extend coverage over this period was made only after the conclusion of the visit. Canton TV announced on 29 February that its relay of Peking television coverage of the visit--which had continued daily since 22 February--would end that day, but on 1 March it again relayed Peking and announced on the 2d that this would continue until the 4th. The relays during this period included reruns of film on the visit itself, but the program on 1 March pointedly juxtaposed a rerun of the President's meeting with Mao and the initial television coverage of Chou's return to Peking.

Peking's last original reference to the visit was a report on the President's arrival back in Washington released by NCNA some 45 hours after the fact. The NCNA account reported that the President gave a 10-minute television speech but provided no details. Mentioning the presence of foreign diplomatic envoys at the airport, NCNA took special note of the absence of the "so-called 'ambassador' of the Chiang Kai-shek clique." In the manner of NCNA's account of the President's departure for China, which sought to underscore bipartisan support for the trip, the report on his return took care to note the presence of Congressional leaders of both parties at the airport and to mention the President's briefing of leading members of Congress from both parties the day after his return.

CRITICISM OF U.S. While Peking has resumed low-level criticism of the United States, there have been no authoritative commentaries centering on U.S. policies and no directly critical statements by Politburo-level

* The joint communique on Sihanouk's visit and Hanoi's reaction to the President's China trip are discussed in the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

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leaders. The Chinese have thus far ignored statements by Administration spokesmen reaffirming U.S. commitments to the ROC and have not reported Assistant Secretary Green's trip to Asian capitals to explain the President's visit to allied governments.

Peking's most polemical thrust at the United States since the President's trip was contained in an address by An Chih-yuan, the PRC delegate to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed, which was transmitted textually by NCNA on 3 March and widely broadcast by Radio Peking. After sternly taking the two superpowers to task for using the seabed for arms expansion and for refusing to heed the claims of Latin American and other countries to wider territorial sea limits and jurisdiction, An used this forum to reassert the PRC's own territorial claims and rights to disputed islands and other resources off the China coast. An attacked the United States for colluding with Japan to include the Senkakus within the scope of the Okinawa reversion agreement and denounced American survey activities along the continental shelf. The Chinese delegate expressed "the utmost indignation" at these "flagrant acts of aggression and plunder" and declared that it is "absolutely impermissible for any foreign aggressor to poke his fingers" into the seabed resources claimed by Peking.

An opened his discussion of Peking's claim to the disputed islands with a standard charge that the United States is "to this day forcibly occupying China's territory Taiwan province." Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, speaking at a Moroccan Embassy reception on 3 March, also raised the Taiwan question but did not mention the United States in that connection. Chi praised Morocco for having opposed "two Chinas" and other formulas objectionable to Peking. He barely alluded to the United States in calling on the Arabs to "guard against the schemes of the one or two superpowers."

Peking's effort to find common cause with third world countries also accounts for a sally against the United States by a Chinese official at a 7 March banquet for a Chilean Socialist Party leader. Wang Kuo-chuan, representing the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries, praised the Chilean Government for its "just struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and oppression" and for defending its rights to 200-mile territorial waters.

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Peking has also resumed low-level reports on U.S. economic difficulties. A 6 March NCNA dispatch, citing a Commerce Department announcement on the U.S. foreign trade deficit in January, followed familiar lines in depicting American competitive weakness and decline in the international economy.

PYONGYANG ENDORSES VISIT, EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT HANOI

Tendering Pyongyang's approval of its Chinese ally's conduct in receiving President Nixon, a 4 March NODONG SINMUN editorial followed the lines of earlier North Korean comment in welcoming the trip as a victory for the Chinese and in depicting the President as having undertaken a "tour of mendicant diplomacy with a white flag." While interpreting the trip as an act of surrender by the United States and a defeat for its policy of containment of China, the editorial notably refrained from the personal invective directed against the President that has marked Pyongyang's comment in past years. Noting that the two sides pledged in the joint communique to base their relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence and to facilitate further contacts, the editorial observed that it is "a good thing" for countries to strive to normalize relations and to seek a relaxation of international tension.

COMMUNIST UNITY Notwithstanding this endorsement of the trip, the editorial struck what may seem to Peking a discordant note, and an echo of Hanoi's angry polemics, when it accused the United States of seeking to foment communist dissension by continuing its military actions in Indochina while talking about peace. Without explicitly referring to the President's trip in this connection, the editorial complained that the United States is resorting to "all sorts of maneuvers" to suppress the world revolutionary forces and is intensifying the war in Vietnam. "This is a vicious challenge to the Vietnamese people and, at the same time, a trick to create dissension among the socialist countries," the editorial warned.

Pyongyang had previously alluded to the effect of the President's trip on communist unity in a joint communique on the visit to North Korea last December by a "special envoy" of Sihanouk's front, Ieng Sary, who himself had warned of U.S. "trickery" and attempts to deny the rights of small countries in connection with the President's trip. The communique pointed to a need to strengthen mutual support and solidarity among anti-imperialist forces at a time when the United States is attempting to "disorganize them."

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In September, however, Hungarian President Losonczi received a cool reception when he went to the DPRK to warn--presumably in behalf of the Soviet bloc--about the dangers of attempts to foment dissension among the communist countries. In a banquet speech Losonczi had said his visit had been successful and that a communique had been prepared that "faithfully reflects the agreement of our aims," but no communique was ever released. Pyongyang's accounts of his speeches during the visit omitted his polemical remarks about communist unity, and Korean speakers themselves avoided the subject.

While Pyongyang has sought to swim with the current of Sino-U.S. detente, the 4 March editorial's warning about U.S. efforts to create communist discord suggests a nagging concern over Hanoi's plight at a time when the biggest Asian communist country welcomes the enemy's chief. In previous years Pyongyang had been stridently vocal about the need for other communist countries to put the Vietnamese communist cause above all others, and relations between Pyongyang and Peking had become severely strained in the second half of the 1960's over Chinese insistence on placing the needs of the rivalry with Moscow over those of the Vietnamese comrades.

Peking's failure to publicize the 4 March editorial contrasts with its eagerness last August to make use of Pyongyang's endorsement of the invitation to the President. PRC media had carried the full text of Kim Il-song's 6 August speech as well as a NODONG SINMUN editorial of 8 August lauding Peking's demarche.

KOREAN SITUATION The 4 March editorial, after welcoming the Chinese statement in the joint communique expressing support for Pyongyang's eight-point Korean unification program and for the demand to abolish UNCURK, called upon the United States to back up its words about peace with concrete deeds in Korea. The editorial demanded that the United States withdraw its troops from Korea and that the UN resolutions on Korea be revoked. Addressing the South Korean leaders, the editorial called for talks between North and South and asked the South Koreans to respond to Pyongyang's "just proposals" for peaceful unification. The editorial did not, however, mention Kim Il-song's recent proposal on a North-South peace pact that would not be contingent on a U.S. troop withdrawal.

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PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA OFFER CAUTIOUS INITIAL APPRAISALS

The closest Moscow has yet come to an authoritative appraisal of the President's China visit in PRAVDA appears as part of Georgiy Ratiani's "International Review" in the 5 March issue and is notable for its gingerly approach to the key aspect of the visit from the Soviet standpoint--the triangular Sino-Soviet-U.S. relationship, which Moscow had largely avoided broaching head-on in comment prior to and during the visit.

Ratiani's basic conclusion is that the major factor impelling "Washington" toward rapprochement with Peking may have been the "anti-Sovietism" of the Chinese course. The cautiously hedged expression of this judgment and its placement in a relatively inconspicuous place, in one section of the grab-bag "International Review" rather than in a full-scale article under a more authoritative byline, suggest that Moscow is still marking time on a definitive appraisal of the trip but felt constrained to come out with at least a preliminary assessment on the pages of the party daily.

Ratiani leads into the subject of the trip cautiously with the observation that the "initial results" are being "analyzed throughout the world," and his discussion draws for the most part on U.S. press comments. He refers directly to the Administration on his own authority only once, in the remark that "both the Johnson Administration and the present Administration" have persistently tried to save the unsalvageable in Asia, despite counsel from "reasonable voices" favoring a radical shift in Asian policy. The article quotes AP for one reference to "an informed Administration representative" and mentions the President by name only in quoting foreign sources.

Ratiani builds up to his basic conclusion with the argument that "Washington decided in a presidential election year to revise only a single element of its overall Asian and Far Eastern policy that has existed since the time of General MacArthur--that is, to 'build a bridge' in relations with China." It is on grounds that "all other elements," including policies on Indochina, Korea, and the maintenance of military bases in Asia, remain unchanged that Ratiani says "it is possible to suppose" that "Washington was urged toward such a step more by the anti-Sovietism of Peking's course than by concern for peace in this region."

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Ratiani uses proxy U.S. comment to caution the United States, in effect, not to try to use its newly improved relations with Peking as a bargaining counter against the Soviet Union. Thus he points out that "those U.S. circles which soberly assess the situation" are "seriously alarmed" by such a prospect, and as documentation he invokes an observation by Asian scholar Doak Barnett: "If the U.S. Administration decides to attempt to establish close relations with the Chinese at the expense of relations with the Soviet Union, this may be fraught with a threat." Ratiani adds: "Barnett does not conceal the fact that he is talking about a threat to American policy itself."

Against the background of earlier, pervasive warnings in Soviet and East European propaganda that a sellout of Hanoi might be in the offing in the Sino-U.S. talks, Ratiani now suggests that a "bargain" was concluded at Hanoi's expense. He cites the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR for this view, quoting it as inferring from the joint communique that President Nixon "suggested that the United States will leave Taiwan if the Chinese will help convince Hanoi to accept American terms--that is, essentially, to capitulate." It is on grounds that "many other well-informed American newspapers" hold the same view that Ratiani concludes that "Washington has struck a bargain with Peking behind the backs of the Vietnamese and the other Asian peoples." Contrasting Peking's alleged perfidy with Moscow's steadfastness, he adds that the Indochinese peoples have "reliable friends, who are rendering them firm and resolute support . . . , and only profound disappointment awaits those who wish to rectify their affairs by zigzags in their policy without wanting essentially to change it."

OTHER MOSCOW COMMENT A Washington-dated dispatch by Kondrashov in the government organ IZVESTIYA on 3 March had also cited "the American press" for the view that "the motive prompting the attempts to achieve American-Chinese rapprochement has been and remains the Peking leadership's anti-Sovietism, which coincides with Nixon's foreign policy interests." But Kondrashov did not elaborate this point. Much of his dispatch was devoted to a caustic but essentially innocuous discourse on "television diplomacy," taking note of the President's statement that his week in China has changed the world and suggesting that the purpose in an election year was to make the American voters believe this was so. Kondrashov remarked: "It should be clear to the Washington leaders that historical development is determined

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in no way by the visit to Peking, but by the fundamental processes now taking place in the world, by the influence of the revolutionary forces." In another passage Kondrashov observed sarcastically that in the context of the recent Sino-American talks, Peking's "'firm' support for the people's liberation struggle now has approximately the same kind of weight that Peking's nearly 600 serious 'warnings' to American imperialism have had in the past."

The element of continued temporizing in Moscow's reaction was reflected in the weekly commentators' roundtable over the Moscow domestic service on the 5th, when panelist Mayevskiy noted that "Western, and particularly American," observers were still engaged in conjectures about the results of the trip "because, as is known, the communique does not reveal the content" of the talks. Much of Moscow's comment since the release of the communique has resorted to this gambit, suggesting that the document concealed far more than it divulged and quoting U.S. newsmen's speculation to suggest that deals may have been concluded--especially on Indochina--without directly and authoritatively associating the Soviet Union with this charge.

Moscow's suspicious wait-and-see stance was typified by an article on the trip by D. Volskiy in the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES on 3 March, again using the line that the joint communique "gave no idea of the content of the negotiations." Reaffirming the recurrent Soviet line that "the very fact of the improvement of relations between the United States and China could be welcomed," Volskiy added: "The crux of the matter is under what conditions and on what basis the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement takes place, what real objectives Peking and Washington are pursuing, and what form their foreign policy practice will assume." Volskiy concluded that "the future will show this."

Moscow's touchiness with respect to treatment of President Nixon was graphically illustrated on 7 March when TASS issued a correction deleting an abusive epithet applied to the President. The original version, under a London dateline, began: "Smiles on China, bombs on Indochina: This was the recipe with which President tricky Dicky Nixon went to China" Some two hours later, TASS filed a correction attributing the passage to the British CP organ ("Commenting on President Nixon's trip to the PRC, the MORNING STAR writes . . .") and deleting the derisive epithet.

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BUDAPEST EXAMINES IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT

Hungarian comment on the President's China visit has sustained the relatively measured tone that has distinguished it from the rhetoric from Moscow's other hardlining allies, while playing many of the same themes. The tone and content of Budapest's approach is exemplified in a 5 March article in the party daily NEPSZABADSAG over the signature of the paper's leading commentator on international communist affairs, Ferenc Varnai. After a lengthy discourse on considerations motivating the "deep suspicion" that surrounds the talks between the leaders of "U.S. imperialism" and "Maoism," Varnai embroiders the theme that Peking is acting against its own interests in rebuffing Moscow's overtures for better relations and in pursuing its "unprincipled" rapprochement with Washington.

Varnai notes worldwide interest in how the visit will affect China's relations with Moscow and with "the socialist world," commenting that the answer is not simple "because of the zigzags and unprincipled policies" pursued by Peking. At the same time, he says, one "cannot exclude with complete certainty" the possibility that the Chinese leadership will again respond to Soviet initiatives, long on record, for improving relations. Emphasizing that the onus is on Peking, Varnai concludes that "the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries will not miss a single opportunity which could facilitate an improvement of relations with China," but that "only facts and deeds" can be the criteria for judging the situation.

Cautioning the Chinese on the pitfalls of letting themselves be used by Washington, Varnai asks rhetorically what guarantee the Chinese leaders have that they will be able to exploit the recent "anti-Soviet encounter" with the President to their own advantage and that they will not "become tools of the Americans." He underscores China's isolation from the "socialist" world and, on the score of China's economic problems, asks rhetorically whether it was possible that the Chinese could have learned nothing from the experiences of third-world countries and are prepared to "sell themselves" to the United States.

In the 3 March issue of the Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG, the Hungarian news agency MTI's Moscow correspondent Pal Bokor had described the Soviet reaction to the President's China trip as underscoring Peking's overriding motives of "anti-Sovietism."

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The Soviet Union, according to the correspondent, has concluded from the evidence so far that the trip served interests counter to the cause of relaxing international tension. In the vein of Varnai's article, Bokor cautioned the Chinese of the consequences to their own "prestige" that could flow from "unprincipled political moves."

Betraying a fear that Moscow and its other allies have avoided expressing in their comment, Bokor pointed to the "danger to the cause of world peace" from the possibility that the United States, "under the pretext of trade links, may contribute directly or indirectly to the militarization of China." Again in the vein of Varnai's article he concluded that if, on the other hand, the Sino-U.S. rapprochement should take on "a positive meaning" in line with "the principles of peaceful coexistence," then "this would necessarily also facilitate an improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations."

EAST GERMAN MEDIA BELATEDLY JOIN IN SOVIET BLOC ATTACKS

After largely refraining from original comment during and immediately after the President's China visit, East Berlin media began to attack the trip on 2 March. The 29 February Moscow TRUD article, also picked up by Prague but unpublicized in Moscow's own broadcast media, formed the peg for a commentary in the 2 March issue of the semiofficial BERLINER ZEITUNG. The author quoted TRUD to the effect that "it was precisely the policy of 'Vietnamization' announced by Nixon in 1969 which prompted the Maoists to invite the President to Peking" and that "this policy suits the Chinese leaders. The thing is, they want to utilize the American policy of pitting Asians against Asians for their big-power goals." It further quoted TRUD in noting that en route home the President stopped off in Guam, "from where U.S. aircraft loaded with napalm usually take off for terrorist attacks against Vietnamese women and children." The East German commentator assailed the "tremendous escalation" of U.S. bombing in Indochina, remarking that "not a single word about this could be heard from Mr. Nixon's hosts," who continued "their hateful and sharp attacks against the USSR."

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The party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND joined in the attack on the 3d and 4th. An article entitled "The Fog Lifts," on the 3d, joined the East European chorus in saying "everything points to the understanding between the Mao group and the U.S. Administration being directed essentially against the Soviet Union and the socialist community firmly linked to it." A vitriolic article in the next day's issue of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, entitled "Miscalculation of the Killers," was devoted entirely to an attack on "the policy of genocide" allegedly pursued by the United States in Indochina "without interference" from Peking and "camouflaged" in the Sino-U.S. communique.

The semiofficial foreign affairs weekly HORIZONT, which had carried the only original GDR commentary during the President's visit in its last February issue (No. 9), added another in its first March issue (No. 10)--a commentary entitled "Conspiracy in Peking." In addition to counterposing the visit to stepped-up bombing in Indochina and scoring its "anti-Soviet" aspect, this commentary ridiculed the President's "euphoric outburst" about having changed the world as "nonsensical ostentatious boasting."

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi has continued to avoid any explicit mention of President Nixon's trip to China, but its disapproval has been dramatically demonstrated in DRV media during the past week. Hanoi on 2 March took the occasion of the 53d anniversary of the Comintern to issue a NHAN DAN editorial--something it had not done even on the 50th anniversary--which pointedly noted the DRV's role in working for socialist unity and in struggling against "U.S. imperialism, the number one enemy of mankind." A NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d went so far as to quote some of the President's statements in China and passages from the Sino-U.S. joint communique--identifying them as from a "recent document"--as further evidence of U.S. duplicity. This pattern has continued in subsequent propaganda, including the DRV-Cambodian communique issued on the 5th at the end of Sihanouk's visit to Hanoi, and most notably in a lengthy QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 8th.

U.S. air strikes against the DRV during the past week prompted a 6 March Foreign Ministry statement as well as routine protests by the ministry spokesman. The flurry of propaganda quoting the President's remarks in Peking says that his "hypocrisy" regarding a peaceful settlement in Indochina was pointed up by continued U.S. air strikes.

Peking has originated no substantial comment on Indochina since the President's arrival in Peking on 21 February. PRC media duly reported the text of the DRV-Cambodian communique and NCNA summarized the supporting NHAN DAN editorial, though deleting its strongest attacks on the President. Peking has continued to carry Indochinese propaganda on military action, including the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the recent U.S. air strikes. If past practice is followed, a supporting PRC Foreign Ministry statement should be forthcoming.

Moscow has continued to raise the spectre of a backstage Sino-U.S. deal on Vietnam, and it promptly reported the 3 March NHAN DAN Commentator article. Soviet support for the Vietnamese was highlighted in publicity for the 25 February - 4 March visits to Hanoi of Minister of Culture Furtseva and Minister of the Maritime Fleet Guzhenko.

DRV ATTACKS PRESIDENT'S CHINA VISIT WITHOUT REPORTING EVENT

NHAN DAN'S COMMENTATOR In his 3 March article NHAN DAN's Commentator seemed at pains to make sure his allusions to the President's remarks in China and to the statements in the Sino-U.S. communique were not missed. While continuing Hanoi's

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studied avoidance of any explicit mention of the President's China visit, he took issue with the President's statements "in a recent document"* regarding Indochinese self-determination and the eight-point proposal as a basis for a negotiated settlement. Commentator then went on to quote from the President's speeches in China, ridiculing him for "also ballyhooing the U.S. desire to remove the 'many walls still existing in the world which divide nations and people . . .'" Commentator observed pointedly that at the same time that the President was making these statements he "ordered intensified air attacks on both zones of Vietnam."** The article was not significantly harsher than the series of Commentator articles in recent weeks when it described the President as the "bellicose, ferocious, ruthless, and tricky imperialist ringleader." But these epithets are of more than passing interest because of the implicit context of Sino-U.S. relations.

Commentator clearly took issue with the statements in the joint communique in which the PRC and the United States expressed common positions: Thus he answered a rhetorical question by saying it is "U.S. imperialism" that is "creating hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region." He also sniped at such passages in the communique as those on reducing the danger of military conflict and on major countries avoiding collusion with other countries. In posing his series of rhetorical questions, Commentator also said it is "U.S. imperialism" that is threatening the security and committing aggression against nations and is "sowing discord among the socialist countries and the forces of revolution and progress." He concluded that "Nixon's universally known war crimes in Vietnam" as well as other actions have shown that the "aggressive, bellicose, ferocious, and obdurate nature of U.S. imperialism has not changed a bit, that U.S. imperialism is the most dangerous enemy, the number one enemy of all nations of the world."

* PRAVDA on 4 March published a lengthy account of the article from its Hanoi correspondent which contained most of the quotations from the communique and the President's speeches. Strangely, it referred to "one" document rather than to a "recent" document.

** Hanoi had seemed clearly to be signaling its displeasure to Peking over the visit when it ignored a 19 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement endorsing the DRV Foreign Ministry protest over U.S. air strikes on 16-17 February. Hanoi finally acknowledged the Chinese statement on 1 March--two days after the President's visit ended.

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Commentator was more subtle in conveying Hanoi's displeasure over Peking's statements on an Indochina political settlement in the communique. His failure to mention the PRG proposal--an unprecedented omission in any Hanoi discussion of a political settlement--while stating that the Vietnamese and the world public have "exposed" the true nature of the United States' eight points may have been contrived to point up Hanoi's annoyance over the passage in the communique in which Peking supported the PRG stand but did not criticize the U.S. position.

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
COMMENTATOR

The Commentator article in the army paper on the 8th--broadcast by Hanoi radio and reviewed by VNA, like the NHAN DAN article of the 3d--was even more pointed than the NHAN DAN article in its use of remarks made during the President's visit. Thus it singled out, without attribution, a remark the President had made on his departure for Peking which Chou En-lai had "noted" in his banquet speech on 21 February. Observing that "Nixon is doing his best to create a new image of U.S. imperialism," Commentator declared: "He said what the nations in the world and U.S. imperialism must do is find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war." Commentator followed this immediately with the statement that "piously he called on the latter to join U.S. imperialism in 'a long march together on different paths leading to the same goal of peace and justice'"--a paraphrase of some of the President's remarks at the banquet on the 21st.

The lengthy QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article was divided into sections on Vietnamization, the eight-point peace plan, regional alliances, and "attempts to blur the line between revolution and counterrevolution." It was under the last section that Commentator placed the above quotations. He went on to ridicule the President's remarks on the future of children, remarking that "all this inflated rhetoric is being made by a representative of U.S. monopoly capitalism, notorious for his anticommunist activity, his reactionary and bellicose stand."

The army paper pointed to remarks by the President--statements in fact made in Peking--which it said contradicted his foreign policy report. It quoted him as stating, for example, that he did not "seek the territory" of other countries, where in the foreign policy report he had made it clear that "a leading American role

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in world affairs continues to be indispensable." Some statements Commentator attributed to the President were actually drawn from the section of the Sino-U.S. communique which spelled out agreed positions. Thus Commentator said "Nixon boasted about 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states' and 'nonaggression against other states.'" The article also said "Nixon pleaded that the United States did not 'seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.'"

The Commentator article's sharpest jab at Peking was in the assertion that U.S. "imperialism" hopes to confuse the world's people and lull the revolutionary forces "by putting a coat of peace on its bloody war paint and picturing U.S. neocolonialism as an advocate of the 'future' of nations." However, it added, "to the discerning eyes of the revolutionary people in the world, U.S. imperialism has appeared, especially through the reality of Vietnam, in its true light as the international gendarme." Where the NHAN DAN Commentator on the 3d had charged the United States with "sowing discord among the socialist countries," the army paper's Commentator concluded: "The sacred call of the world today is for the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries."

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DRV COMINTERN ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL SEEMS AIMED AT PEKING

The 2 March NHAN DAN editorial on the 53d anniversary of the founding of the Comintern in effect prepared the groundwork for Hanoi's exploitation of the President's statements in Peking and the Sino-U.S. communique. That the issuance of an editorial on the Comintern anniversary was merely a contrivance to take issue with Peking* is pointed up by the fact that NHAN DAN has not editorially marked previous Comintern anniversaries, not even the 50th in 1969. The 50th anniversary was, however, marked by an article in the party journal HOC TAP.

The editorial repeats--though in more moderate language--arguments voiced during Hanoi's polemic with Peking last summer, again stressing the necessity for all communist parties to hew to policies of proletarian internationalism. It follows up a historical allusion to the Comintern's struggles against "opportunism of all shades" with the pointed assertion that the Comintern made an "extremely great contribution" by bringing to light the principle of associating working class interests with the interests of the nation and "associating genuine patriotism with proletarian internationalism." Bringing this principle into the present context, the editorial later observes that the Vietnamese peoples' struggle against the United States combines "genuine patriotism with proletarian internationalism." It repeats Hanoi's view that the United States is "enemy number one of all nations" and argues that the task of creating a worldwide "united front" against the United States is "an urgent demand of our time."

In the wake of the 15 July announcement of the President's planned China visit, Hanoi statements had pointedly suggested that Peking was not abiding by the tenets of proletarian internationalism; a 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article went so far as to warn of the President's use of nationalism within communist countries and to charge that "one of his

* The AFP correspondent in Hanoi reported that additional attention was drawn to the editorial because the first edition of NHAN DAN on 2 March was withdrawn from the stands and a second edition, containing the editorial, was later issued. The AFP dispatch did not make clear whether the editorial appeared in the first edition of the paper, and there is no other available information on the contents of that edition.

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extremely insidious stratagems is to spread the poison of chauvinism among the opportunists to divide socialist countries" and communist parties. Hanoi's polemic with Peking on the issue of proletarian internationalism had seemed to have been stilled, however, when Pham Van Dong, toward the end of his November visit to Peking, reaffirmed that the two countries' relations were based on "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," thus implying that Hanoi's fears about Chinese policies toward the United States had been assuaged.

The 2 March editorial strongly urges the strengthening of socialist unity in a passage characterizing a slogan on the strengthening of unity against imperialism as "the sacred appeal of the era, the highest directive of the proletarian revolution throughout the world." It goes on to declare that "communists loyal to Marxism-Leninism" always strive to carry out this slogan "in whatever place, at whatever period, and in whatever circumstances."

The editorial adds that the North Vietnamese party has "done its utmost" to "defend the unity and cohesion of the world socialist system" and communist movement "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." But it does not go on to recall the appeal in Ho Chi Minh's testament for his party to help restore socialist unity, nor does it echo previous DRV pledges to contribute to the restoration of unity. By contrast, Pham Van Dong, speaking at a 24 November banquet in Peking, had quoted Ho's expression of hope "that our party will do its best to contribute effectively to the restoration of unity among the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarianism . . ." and added the conviction "that this profound desire will be realized."

COMMUNIQUE ON SIHANOUK'S DRV VISIT QUOTES SINO-U.S. DOCUMENT

The joint communique on Sihanouk's 12 February - 5 March visit to the DRV* elaborates on U.S. "perfidy and bellicosity" in terms that could be read as implicitly critical of Peking's rapprochement with the United States and quotes from the joint communique on the President's China visit--without identifying it--in calling the U.S. statement on American withdrawal from

* Initial propaganda on the visit is discussed in the 16 February TRENDS, pages 13-15.

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Indochina "hypocrisy." A 6 March NHAN DAN editorial on the DRV-Cambodian communique similarly quotes from the Sino-U.S. document without attribution.

The DRV-Cambodian communique, dated 5 March, pointedly states that "U.S. imperialism is the cruelest, most obstinate, and most dangerous enemy of the Indochinese peoples and of mankind as a whole" and that its "aggressive and bellicose nature has not in the least changed, as proved by the 'Nixon Doctrine.'" In a later passage, after assailing the eight-point peace plan divulged by President Nixon on 25 January, the communique quotes from the Sino-U.S. communique when it says that "more recently" the U.S. Administration has "hypocritically" declared that in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination of each Indochinese country. The next day's NHAN DAN editorial alludes to the Sino-U.S. document in slightly different terms. According to a Vietnamese-language radio report of the editorial, it scores President Nixon's eight-point plan as a "farce" which, like "the 'negotiated settlement' which Nixon has just announced as the 'constant primary objective' of the United States in Indochina," is merely calculated to mask U.S. "neocolonialist designs" in Indochina. (A VNA English version of the editorial makes the allusion to the Sino-U.S. communique less pointed by referring to the negotiated settlement which the President "calls" the constant primary objective of the United States, where the radio specifies that this was something the President had "just announced.")

"Categorically rejecting" the President's eight points, the DRV-Cambodian communique demands that the United States give "a positive response" to the "two key problems" of the PRG's seven-point solution. It again expresses support for Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 five-point proclamation and the "political program" of his Front, and it reiterates the DRV's recognition of Sihanouk as the Cambodian head of state and of his government as the only legal and legitimate government of Cambodia. The communique also supports the NLHS five-point political solution of 6 March 1970. After citing both sides' determination to fight until victory, the communique reaffirms their loyalty to the joint declaration of the Indochinese people's summit conference and recalls the conference pledge of "reciprocal support."

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The Cambodian delegation arrived in Shanghai from the DRV on 5 March. Routine Hanoi propaganda on the trip had called it an "unofficial visit" for the Tet holiday, where the 5 March joint communique calls it a "friendship visit." Sihanouk's activities got relatively little publicity during his three-week stay in the DRV; the usual banquets and speeches were omitted, perhaps to underscore the "unofficial" nature of the visit. The trip had apparently been designed as a show of Indochinese solidarity during President Nixon's visit to Peking; it also provided Sihanouk with a pretext for being absent from Peking during the President's visit.

The joint communique says that in Sihanouk's talks with the DRV leaders, which took place in "an atmosphere of militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and total mutual confidence," the two sides "held identical views on all questions discussed." Similar characterizations had appeared in the communiques on Sihanouk's two previous visits to the DRV--in May-June 1970 and January-February 1971--as well as on the November 1971 visit of Ieng Sary, who was also a member of Sihanouk's delegation on the recent visit. According to the communique, Sihanouk met with Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. During his last two visits he did not see Le Duan or Truong Chinh, but Ieng Sary met with Le Duan. Before Sihanouk left Peking, he told Western reporters that he expected to confer with Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong as well as with Vietnamese leaders, but communist media contained no indication that Souphanouvong was in Hanoi.

AIR STRIKES AGAINST DRV PROMPT FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT

The U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam since 1 March have prompted two routine foreign ministry spokesman's statements on the 4th, another on the 5th, and a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 6th--a level at which Hanoi had last protested on 17 February.* On the 8th Hanoi issued another statement at the spokesman's level.

The foreign ministry statement charged that from 1 to 6 March the United States "mobilized a large air force" to carry out "daily attacks on many populous areas in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh

* See the 24 February TRENDS, pages 24-28.

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provinces and in Vinh Linh area." But it did not repeat the details of the strikes from 1 through 5 March which had been recounted in the series of spokesman's statements, nor did it say anything specifically about the strikes it said took place on the 6th. The statement claimed that five planes had been downed during the period, but neither it nor other propaganda mentioned the capture of any pilots. (Hanoi on the 4th said that on that day an F-4 had been shot down over Quang Binh and an unmanned plane over Vinh Linh. On the 6th Hanoi said that an unmanned plane intruding over Quang Binh Province was downed and that two U.S. jets were downed by the armed forces of Nghe An, bringing the total to 3,445.)

The foreign ministry statement paralleled earlier ones in charging that the U.S. actions "constitute extremely serious acts of war." It also restored the charge--strangely absent from the 17 February statement--that the strikes are "very shameless violations of the U.S. commitment" to end the bombing of the North. The statement echoed the language of the 29 December foreign ministry statement during the heavy, sustained strikes when it called on "the governments and peoples of the fraternal socialist countries and peace- and justice-loving countries . . . to take resolute and timely measures" to check the U.S. "imperialists" and "to increase their support and assistance" to the Indochinese peoples.

Comment following up the statement came promptly in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 6th and in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th. There is the usual reference to vigilance, with the army paper declaring that since the end of December "our armed forces and people downed nearly 40 U.S. aircraft and killed or captured many aggressor pilots." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN also calls for heightened vigilance, and it expresses determination to "smash every destruction maneuver of the enemy, downing aircraft, sinking warships and killing or capturing enemy commandos and aggressor pilots in order to protect the people's security, lives, and property."

NHAN DAN COMMENTATOR An 8 March NHAN DAN Commentator article pegged to the foreign ministry statement, entitled "Bloody Hands, Peaceful Words," pursues Hanoi's pattern of quoting without attribution from President Nixon's remarks in China and from the Sino-U.S. communique. In strikingly vitriolic language, Commentator says that what is most "brazen"

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is that "recently while Nixon was soaking his hands in the blood of the Vietnamese people, he noisily ballyhooed about 'peaceful negotiations' and about 'respect for the right to self-determination' of the Vietnamese people and the people of many other countries."

Commentator also scores the President's "boast" about his concern for children and points out that many Vietnamese children have been "killed, injured or disabled" or lost their parents because of U.S. bombs; a radio commentary broadcast on the 7th, decrying the loss of children in the air strikes, also scores the President for "continuing to boast that he 'cares for future generations.'" Calling the President "the warmongering, bloodthirsty archimperialist," Commentator says it is clear that he is using bombs in an attempt to force negotiations on his terms. But the article concludes that the Vietnamese "have always clearly understood U.S. imperialism. They will never be afraid or deceived by it."

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VWP SECRETARIAT SCORES FAILURE TO DISSEMINATE PROPAGANDA

Hanoi media on 4 March publicized a North Vietnamese party (VWP) Secretariat circular on the distribution and use of newspapers along with a supporting NHAN DAN editorial. The circular, dated 24 February, expressed concern over "shortcomings" in the distribution and use of papers, noting, for example, that NHAN DAN has not been sent to all party chapters and that newspapers are not regularly read in many places. The extent of the problem was illustrated in the Secretariat's complaint that in some delta provinces 50 percent of the township party committees do not receive NHAN DAN and that even fewer papers are delivered in the mountain areas. The circular pointed to the role of the press in guiding, "persuading, educating, and organizing" the party and people, and it urged that cadres, party members, and members of mass organizations "acquire the habit of reading newspapers and listening to the radio and realize that the newspapers are their daily spiritual food."

The timing of the release of the circular could raise the question whether its promulgation was related to Hanoi's concern to propagandize its foreign policy position in the face of President Nixon's trip to China. The circular did briefly note that "in recent days" the press has--among other things--endeavored to increase its quality, to faithfully propagandize the party's lines and policies, and "to reflect current events." But its main stress was on domestic issues.

The NHAN DAN editorial recalled that the Secretariat had previously issued a circular on press distribution on 13 December 1958. The issue of distribution was raised more recently at a conference called by the Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Training, publicized in June 1969. The conference, as reported in the 7 June 1969 NHAN DAN and the June issue of the propaganda department's journal, TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), discussed the distribution of newspapers since the start of U.S. bombing in 1965 and, like the current circular, noted the need for improvement in distribution and use of the press.

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CAMBODIAN PLAF COMMAND CALLS FOR "LIBERATION" OF KOMPONG THOM

An appeal for the "liberation" of the Cambodian town of Kompong Thom was publicized on 29 February by AKI, the Sihanouk government's news agency. The appeal, reportedly issued on 25 February by the Cambodian liberation army (CNPLAF) command on the Kompong Thom front, reviewed alleged communist successes in January and February. Claiming the overrunning of positions around Kompong Thom, it noted finally that on the night of 24 February the garrison of Panhachi was encircled and that government positions on all sides of the city were surrounded and continuously attacked.

The appeal seemed mainly aimed at demoralizing government forces and causing them to defect. It predicted that it is "inevitable" that the troops in the city of Kompong Thom, completely cut off and short on supplies, "will be completely annihilated in their turn." It also called for more rigorous implementation of the CNPLAF's plan of attack and asserted that "the city of Kompong Thom will certainly be liberated."

The continuation of fighting in the Kompong Thom area was noted in a 3 March AKI battle report and a Hanoi broadcast to the South on 7 March, and NCNA on the 7th briefly cited alleged CNPLAF achievements in the area in recent weeks.

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USSR - BANGLADESH

MUJIBUR'S VISIT CEMENTS CLOSE TIES WITH SOVIET UNION

Celebrating Soviet-Bangladesh friendship, recording promises of extensive Soviet aid and assistance to the new state, and calling for an early negotiated settlement of the outstanding problems of the South Asian subcontinent, the 3 March Soviet-Bangladesh joint "declaration"* marking the 1-5 March "official friendly visit" to the Soviet Union of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman also provided for "regular political consultations" and registered a virtual identity of views between the two states on a number of major international issues. Mujibur's visit, his first as prime minister to a nation outside the subcontinent, included three days of talks with Kosygin and other high-level Soviet officials and meetings with Brezhnev and Podgornyy. The talks were variously described by Soviet media as having taken place in a "warm," "friendly," or "cordial" atmosphere. The joint declaration characterized the atmosphere as one of "cordiality and mutual understanding."

The Mujibur-Kosygin talks appeared to consolidate Moscow's position alongside India as principal patron of the new Bengali state. In addition to Mujibur's visit and the joint declaration, other recent indications of closer Soviet-Bangladesh relations include the disclosure by Moscow's domestic service on 25 February that a regular Moscow-Dacca air route had been "recently inaugurated," a 2 March agreement on economic and technical cooperation, the establishment on the same day in Moscow--with Mujibur in attendance--of a Soviet-Bangladesh Friendship Society, and a 3 March announcement of the opening of a two-way direct radio-teletype line between the news agencies of the USSR and Bangladesh. Also, there have been in recent weeks a number of exchange visits between the two countries of various political, social, and economic groups.

The visit received extensive Soviet propaganda attention--more than twice that accorded Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's 27-29 September state visit to the Soviet Union and significantly more than the publicity devoted to the 14-19 September visit of Afghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir Shah. Soviet media stressed Soviet aid and support for the national liberation struggle of the people of Bangladesh,

* A joint "declaration" stands a notch above a joint "communiqué" in importance.

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sometimes to the extent of crediting the Soviet role for the achievement of Bangladesh's independence. This was particularly true of Moscow's broadcasts in Mandarin to Chinese listeners, for whom Moscow has been contrasting a portrayal of Sino-American conspiracy against the Bangladesh national liberation struggle with the Soviet Union's principled support for that movement. Soviet comment and reportage came close to depicting Mujibur's visit to Moscow, Leningrad, and Tashkent as a tour of gratitude to enable Mujibur to extend his people's thanks to the Soviet people. India's role in the liberation struggle went virtually unmentioned in Soviet publicity for Mujibur's visit.

BILATERAL RELATIONS The principal focus of the joint declaration of 3 March, carried in full by TASS on the 4th, is on bilateral relations, with emphasis on expressions of Bangladesh gratitude to the Soviet Union for its aid and support during the struggle for independence, on Soviet commitments of continuing economic aid and technical assistance, and on "the further development of friendly relations and fruitful cooperation" between the two countries in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural, "and other fields."

An emphasis on economic issues was indicated by the participation of such Soviet officials as N. K. Baybakov and V. N. Novikov, both deputy premiers concerned with economic affairs; S. A. Skachkov, the Soviet aid official; and M. R. Kuzmin, first deputy minister of Foreign Trade. Economic assistance is the subject treated most extensively in the joint declaration, which observes that among the first steps in the development of Soviet-Bangladesh cooperation were the signing of the trade agreement and the establishment of bilateral sea and air communications. Noting that "great attention was paid during the talks to the questions of expanding trade between the two countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favored-nation treatment," the declaration goes on to cite specific areas in which the Soviet Union will provide economic and technical assistance: construction of a thermal power station, radio broadcasting stations, and other power plants; exploration for gas and petroleum; reconstruction of the merchant marine and of railway transport; development of sea fisheries; provision of helicopters for improvement of air communications; training of national cadres for various branches of industry and agriculture; and provision of consultative services on problems of the reconstruction of industry. Agreeing to expand bilateral trade, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness "to purchase not only the goods traditionally exported by Bangladesh, but also other goods."

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In the political field the joint declaration formalized Kosygin's expression of hope--made in a 1 March speech at a Soviet Government dinner for Mujibur--that the sheikh's visit "will mark the beginning of direct contacts between the leaders of our countries." The declaration records an agreement "to hold regular political consultations" at various levels of the two governments "on all important matters involving the interests of both states," the consultations to be effected "through meetings of leading statesmen and sending official delegations and special representatives of the governments, through normal diplomatic channels, and in other forms."

Provisions of this nature have become a stock item in joint communiques, statements, declarations, and treaties between Moscow and noncommunist governments. Thus, the 9 August Soviet-Indian treaty provides for the maintenance of "regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both sides, through meetings and exchange of opinions between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations, and special representatives of the two governments and through diplomatic channels." The 27 May Soviet-UAR treaty and communiques signed by Moscow with Canada and France in October and with Denmark and Norway in December also call for regular political consultations.

The joint declaration also called for the promotion of contacts between Soviet and Bangladesh governmental and social organizations and for scientific, cultural, and other exchanges. That Moscow may wish some form of contact on the party level--as it has with other noncommunist countries on close terms with the USSR--is suggested by the presence at the formal talks of B. N. Ponomarev, the CPSU secretary in charge of relations with parties in noncommunist countries.

SOUTH ASIA Noting the "great attention" devoted in the talks to "the situation existing on the subcontinent," the joint declaration appeals for restraint by all outside powers from interference in the subcontinent and for "an early normalization of the situation in that region." It calls for a "genuine political settlement" through "negotiations between the states directly concerned, without outside interference, and having regard to the actual situation, on the basis of the legitimate rights and interests of its people." The document points to the widespread diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of Bangladesh as "convincing evidence of the realization of the situation actually obtaining in that area."

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Both sides refrained during the visit from attacks on the current Bhutto government of Pakistan, confining their references to Pakistan to passing comments on the previous military government of Yahya Khan. Thus, Kosygin in his 1 March speech recalled the "campaign of frightful repression" of the Bengalis carried out by "the former military administration of Pakistan," and a commentator on the 5 March international observers' roundtable on Radio Moscow referred to "the Pakistani brasshats" who had "inflicted great material damage on East Bengal." Mujibur in his return speech on the 1st spoke only of "the punitive forces." The joint declaration contained no mention of Pakistan.

There was less restraint evident in comment on the roles of the United States and the PRC in the recent events on the subcontinent. Kosygin in his 1 March speech referred to Pakistan's support by "certain foreign forces"--not specifically named--who "impeded a political settlement and took no heed of the consequences for the East Bengali people or the Pakistani people," adding that they "clearly counted on being able to maintain the hotbed of tension for the purpose of warming their hands at the fire of an internecine war between the peoples of the Hindustan peninsula." According to the joint declaration, the national liberation struggle of the people of Bangladesh "revealed with utmost clarity not only the attitude of different states to the just cause of the people of Bangladesh but also the true friends and the foes of the People's Republic of Bangladesh as a new independent state." The declaration appeals to all countries to "rebuff any attempts at interference from outside" in the affairs of the subcontinent.

Recent Soviet comment has been explicit in denouncing Washington and Peking for their roles in the struggle of the people of Bangladesh. For example, a commentator on the 5 March observers' roundtable recalled how the United States and the PRC "acted against the just struggle of the people of Bangladesh for liberation and supported the dictatorial regime of Yahya Khan and promoted the spread of the bloody war in East Bengal," adding that the Sino-U.S. communique on President Nixon's trip contained an "understanding on maintaining the policy which is really directed against the Bangladesh people" and thus marked "another step" along the road of Sino-American "cooperation against the Asian peoples."

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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES The joint declaration registers virtual agreement between the two governments on a number of major international issues. Stock Soviet lines are endorsed in sections on Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Mujibur--but not Kosygin--had raised both of these issues in his 1 March speech. Similarly, Bangladesh went on record in support of the Soviet position on a European security conference and on arms control and disarmament measures, and it joined the Soviet side in condemning racism, apartheid "in all forms and manifestations," and colonialism.

Marking a rare Soviet statement of its position on the issue of territorial sea limits, the joint declaration states that the two sides "pronounced themselves in favor of the need to establish the breadth of territorial waters in conformity with the practice of the overwhelming majority of states." In another gesture to its guests, Moscow declared its support for the request of Bangladesh "to be admitted to UN membership."

BACKGROUND: Besides expounding on Soviet aid and support for the Bengali people since the early days of their struggle, Soviet media in the weeks preceding Mujibur's visit emphasized indications of a rapid development of Soviet-Bangladesh friendship--such as exchange visits by various groups--and sought to depict a normalization of the situation in Bangladesh and the stability of its government. Thus, Moscow carried a number of interviews with Bangladesh officials who expressed gratitude for Soviet assistance and explained the basic policies of the Bangladesh Government--land reform, nationalization of economic enterprises, and the establishment of a socialist economy. To justify continued extensive economic aid to Bangladesh, however, Soviet media have stressed the monumental economic problems of the new regime, particularly in view of the widespread destruction inflicted on the Bangladesh economy by the Pakistani forces over the past year. Moscow has also taken particular note of the withdrawal of Indian forces from Bangladesh and the return from India of the Bangladesh refugees.

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MIDDLE EAST

DELAYED COMMUNIQUE SUMS UP LIBYAN DELEGATION'S MOSCOW TALKS

A belated communique sums up the talks held in Moscow between 23 February and 4 March by a Libyan Government delegation headed by Economy and Industry Minister 'Abd as-Salam Jallud. The visit was given meager publicity by Moscow, with only brief accounts of the delegation's activities and no report of the substance of the speeches exchanged during a luncheon on the 25th. PRAVDA on the 6th said Jallud was seen off on the 4th. Moscow radio on the 5th merely said the delegation had left, mentioning no date or send-off ceremony,* and PRAVDA the same day had printed an article by N. Petrov sourly pointing out that an "overtly provocative article" in the Libyan army paper AL-JUNDI coincided with the delegation's official visit.

Text of the communique is not available from Moscow, which released a TASS summary datelined the 8th. The summary coincides in the main with the "text" broadcast by Tripoli radio late on the 7th, with the exception of two passages, juxtaposed in the TASS version, which do not appear in the Libyan version. Also, a variation occurs in the section on the Mediterranean in which TASS says the sides demand the closing down of all "imperialist" bases in the region while Tripoli says "military" bases. It is unclear whether the Tripoli omissions are deliberate or inadvertent. One missing section is a routine passage on Indochina to which the Libyans presumably would voice no objections. The other is a watered-down version of the passage in the recent Soviet-Iraqi communique condemning anticommunism and anti-Sovietism aimed at undermining Arab solidarity and Arab-Soviet cooperation. This had been reduced in the subsequent Soviet-Syrian communique to a reference to the USSR and the socialist countries as the natural and sincere friends of the Arabs and the importance of bolstering this friendship and cooperation. Now TASS' version of the Soviet-Libyan communique says the sides note the "great importance of

* Jallud arrived in Bucharest on the 5th for an official visit; Libyan media had said the visit was expected to start on the 2nd, but later reported that his departure from Moscow had been postponed. It is conceivable that release of the communique was delayed until the arrival in Libya on the 6th of delegation member al-Kharrubi, who left Moscow on the 4th and stopped off in Cairo en route home.

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friendship between the Soviet Union and the progressive Arab forces" for the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and the "Zionist-Israeli aggression."

The Tripoli version says that "lengthy talks" were held by the delegation--which also included Major Mustafa al-Kharrubi, assistant chief of staff of the armed forces--with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin. Libyan media reported that the Podgornyy meeting lasted over five hours and that with Brezhnev over four hours. Both versions of the communique say the meetings were held in an atmosphere of "mutual understanding and frankness." Moscow's characterizations of the first meetings suggest that the atmosphere may have progressively cooled: Talks on the 24th led by Novikov, vice chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, were held in a "friendly atmosphere," according to TASS, which said that the luncheon hosted by Novikov on the 25th was "warm and friendly." The Kosygin meeting on the 24th and that with Podgornyy on the 28th were also described as friendly, but there was no characterization of the conversation with Brezhnev on the 2d.

According to the Tripoli version of the communique, the Libyan side explained the "revolutionary measures" taken in Libya since the 1 September 1969 revolution, and the Soviet side merely expressed support for Libya's "firm stand" regarding the oil companies. Noting the opportunities for developing Libyan-Soviet relations in the political, economic, cultural, technical, trade "and other" fields, the communique says that an economic and technical cooperation agreement was signed by the sides. While a Tripoli radio report on the 4th gave no details in announcing the signing of the agreement, TASS that day said it provides for cooperation in prospecting, extracting and refining oil, developing power generation and other branches of Libya's economy, as well as prospecting for mineral deposits and gas, and training Libyan national cadres.

The communique's passage on the Middle East routinely assails the "Israeli Zionist aggression" backed by imperialism and condemns U.S. support for Israel, as well as denouncing Israel's "expansionist" policy and actions in the occupied territories. Given Libya's hardline position on the problem, there is no reference to Security Council Resolution 242 or to methods of solving the issue. Moscow's standard formulation on the Palestinians is repeated in the sides' expression of support for the Palestinian people's struggle to "regain their lawful rights."

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In conclusion, the communique notes the acceptance of an invitation from the Libyan Revolution Command Council to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to pay official visits to Libya, the dates of which will be fixed later.

JALLUD REMARKS IN ARABIC BROADCASTS Moscow's Arabic-language service gave somewhat more attention to the visit than other media, reporting Jallud's arrival remarks on the 23d, broadcasting a short commentary pegged to the visit on the 24th, and carrying an interview with Jallud on 4 and 6 March. In his arrival remarks, Jallud said the aim of "this first contact" was to strengthen bilateral relations in political and economic fields. The delegation, he said, was looking forward to "political, economic, and military results" and wanted to discuss all issues on which "we would like to cooperate with the Soviet Union as a friend."

In the interview broadcast on 4 March Jallud described Soviet-Libyan relations as those between "progressive revolutions." Remarking that the Soviet Union had worked to strengthen Arab combat capability and economic capacity, he added that "we believe the Soviet Union is capable of doing a lot more for raising the combat capability" of the Arab world.* In what was apparently part of the same interview, broadcast on the 6th, Jallud declared that the Moscow talks were "frank, clear and useful" and achieved "practical results" which "will become known shortly."

In the only available account of the luncheon speeches on 25 February, as reported by the LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY (LNA), Jallud said the delegation came to explain Libya's views on world problems and "how we think and act." He added that all the officials with whom the delegation had met were in agreement with the Libyans "on certain viewpoints." As for the Middle East problem, Jallud noted that the Libyan view was "quite different from the opinions of many progressive forces" in the world and also among the Arabs, and he declared that the dispute "has gone beyond a peaceful settlement."

* Belgrade's TANJUG, in a dispatch from Beirut on the 6th, noted "rumors in diplomatic circles" that agreement was reached in Moscow on the sale of modern weapons to Libya, especially MIG-23 aircraft. It cited the Beirut paper AN-NAHAR as saying that Egyptian military experts accompanied the Libyan delegation to Moscow, and that Libya may have put up the cash for weapons which in the end will go to Egyptian troops.

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PRAVDA In a 5 March PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS,
ARTICLE N. Petrov criticized the Libyan newspaper AL-JUNDI
 for "swallowing anti-Soviet bait" of imperialist
propaganda by alleging that after the June 1967 war U.S.
President Johnson and the Soviet premier "reached agreement
to maintain the Middle East in a state of 'no war, no peace'
advantageous for the Soviet Union." AL-JUNDI, Petrov complained,
has "gone too far in this case." Petrov added that without
batting an eyelid the paper went on to say that "the nature
of Soviet-Arab relations is to keep 'the Arab world constantly
dependent on the USSR,' and so on and so forth." Anyone
pondering the paper's "fabrications" would legitimately ask if
this were not an instance of slightly concealed designs by those
who want to restore imperialist colonial rule in the Arab East,
Petrov said.

Petrov called it noteworthy that the publication of this "overtly
provocative article" coincided with the Libyan delegation's
official visit to Moscow, and concluded that there are persons,
"even within Libya itself," who are out to drive a wedge of
mistrust between Libya and the Soviet Union.

While PRAVDA chose to chide the Libyans by singling out the
article in the army paper, Moscow may also have been indirectly
responding to Libyan criticism of the projected Soviet-Iraqi
treaty. A warning to Iraq against the dangers of concluding
such a treaty was issued by Libya on the 23d, as Jallud arrived
in Moscow. Subsequently, Tripoli radio on the 29th reported
that Prime Minister al-Qadhdhafi had refused to receive the
Iraqi ambassador to Cairo who had been sent to Libya to
explain Iraq's views on the treaty. Baghdad's ATH-THAWRAH,
in turn, said on 3 March that Iraq "normally does not explain
what it agrees on with its friends" except to the masses,
the Arab nation, and "to nationalist brothers and friends who
are not influenced by imperialist and suspect circles."

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GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS

USSR PRESSES STOCK MEASURE, BROACHES ISSUE OF PRC ATTENDANCE

In the pattern of its propaganda treatment of recent sessions of the 26-nation Geneva disarmament conference, Moscow has devoted negligible attention to the resumption of the talks on 29 February. In his remarks at the opening session, chief Soviet delegate Roshchin drew from the stock of familiar partial measures in listing issues to be dealt with at the negotiations. As reported by TASS, he said that a complete ban on chemical weapons should get "priority attention," and he went on to note that other agenda items are the banning of all nuclear tests, including underground tests, further demilitarization of the seabed, "measures toward nuclear disarmament," and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Roshchin concluded by recalling the Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference and appealing to the Geneva participants to contribute to the preparations for such a gathering.

PRC, FRENCH ATTENDANCE Routine-level Soviet propaganda included a foreign-language commentary on 1 March by Shalygin which was notable for an acknowledgment that UN Secretary General Waldheim, in his remarks at the opening session on the 29th, "stressed the significance of the participation of all nuclear states, including France and the PRC, in disarmament talks." The TASS account of the 29 February session had ignored both Waldheim's remarks and those of Mexican delegate Robles, who was quoted in Western news reports as urging Chinese participation and abandonment of the present situation in which the United States and the USSR serve as permanent cochairmen of the conference.

Without mentioning the Geneva talks, a TASS commentary by Vasily Kharkov on 3 March deplored the absence of any reference to disarmament in the U.S.-PRC communique following President Nixon's visit to China. The failure to treat this issue, the commentary said, "shows with fresh force Peking's reluctance to participate in curbing the arms race." Like other propaganda since last summer, the commentary took the Chinese to task for their position on the Soviet proposals for a conference of the five nuclear powers and for a world disarmament conference.

Moscow is on record over the years as endorsing Chinese participation in disarmament negotiations. As recently as last

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December, Roshchin stated before the UN General Assembly's First Committee that "any disarmament talks should involve all nuclear powers as well as all states with considerable military strength." As reported by TASS, he did not mention the Geneva talks specifically. Soviet media have routinely taken note of the continuing French boycott of the conference since 1962 but have given it no special play.

UNDERGROUND In his review of the Geneva conference agenda,
TEST BAN Shalygin mentioned Roshchin's stress on a ban on
 chemical weapons as a priority issue and his
appeal to the conferees to contribute to the preparations for a
world disarmament conclave. Shalygin also characterized a
comprehensive test ban as an "important question" at the talks,
restating Moscow's long-held view that control over underground
tests must be by "national means."

Recent Soviet comment on the underground test issue has been cast largely in the pattern of the Shalygin commentary, calling for a comprehensive ban based on national means of control. But an article by Yu. Tomilin in the second issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN for 1972 (signed to the press on 21 January) discussed the problem in unusual detail. Belaboring U.S. reluctance to sign a comprehensive test-ban accord and criticizing such partial solutions as the British and Canadian proposal allowing underground tests below a designated threshold, Tomilin endorsed Egypt's August 1965 proposal to prohibit underground tests above a magnitude of 4.75 on the Richter scale and place a moratorium on tests below this threshold. Soviet spokesmen at Geneva and elsewhere supported this proposal through 1966, but it has since been largely ignored in Moscow media.

The Tomilin article was also noteworthy for a discussion of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. It stated that a ban on tests "must not put an obstacle in the path of the use of the power from nuclear explosions for peaceful, constructive purposes," and it recalled that U.S. and Soviet delegations had met three times since 1969 to exchange opinions on the matter of peaceful nuclear explosions. The three meetings--in April 1969, February 1970, and July 1971--were briefly reported by TASS at the time but otherwise were given no Soviet publicity.

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PRC AND BRITAIN

PEKING SHOWS MORE FAVORABLE VIEW OF BRITISH MILITARY POLICY

Reflecting Peking's portrayal of Britain's international posture as shifting from the subservient "special relationship" with Washington toward closer unity with other West European states against Soviet and American dominance, NCNA's annual review of the British Government's defense policy white paper was notably more favorable in tone this year than the hostile comment that characterized Chinese coverage of this subject in recent years. In an 18 February NCNA account, the Chinese softpedaled past charges accusing Britain of attempting to solidify colonial and oppressive military policies against China's friends abroad. Instead, discussing this year's white paper against the background of Britain's accession to the Common Market and its moves toward enhancing West European unity "to counter superpower control and intervention," NCNA played up current British efforts to promote closer political and defense relations among West European nations.

In a sharp departure from the hostility previously voiced by Peking toward Britain's membership in the NATO alliance, the NCNA account avoided critical comment while highlighting recommendations from the defense report calling for the development of a stronger and more integrated military role by the European members of the alliance. NCNA downplayed Peking's past criticism of the U.S. role on the continent but took special note of the white paper's call for continued military vigilance in West Europe in response to "the unscrupulous arms expansion by a certain superpower"--meaning the USSR.

In drawing a connection between growing economic relations among the West European nations and the prospect for strengthening military ties, NCNA cited the British report's praise for progress made in recent bilateral talks on defense and joint research in arms production among West European states. The account also cited the white paper's warning that more extensive cooperation is necessary to insure that Europe's security needs will continue to be met.

Concerning British military activities in Asia, NCNA muffled attacks made in past years against London's efforts to retain a military presence in the Indian Ocean and other areas east

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of the Suez. Reporting on British military arrangements in largely matter-of-fact terms, NCNA made a point of noting the white paper's justification that continued British military efforts in such areas as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean are needed because of the "potential threat" posed by Soviet expansion. NCNA also noted the white paper's assertions that Britain will maintain troops east of Suez to strengthen the five-power defense arrangement in Southeast Asia and that a continuing British maritime presence in the Indian Ocean helps to maintain vigilance in that strategic area. Though NCNA interpreted these moves as an attempt to maintain Britain's "remnant colonial interests abroad" at a time of "rapid development of the people's revolutionary struggles" in the third world, the notably less polemical discussion of British military plans suggests that Peking may be less eager than before to insist on a rapid British withdrawal from areas where the Soviets have been asserting their presence.

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USSR - ROMANIA

BUCHAREST PLIES INDEPENDENT COURSE; MOSCOW CALLS FOR UNITY

The discord between the Soviet Union and Romania over the permissible limits of Bucharest's independent foreign policy seems to have resurfaced. According to AGERPRES, Ceausescu received Soviet Ambassador Drozdenko "at the latter's request" on 6 March for talks that passed in a "comradely atmosphere"--a euphemism suggestive of substantive differences. The talks came against the background of reports on 1 March in the Western press, kept out of Romanian media, that Romania has made the first formal approach to the Common Market from a Soviet bloc country--in a letter requesting inclusion among the less developed countries that are permitted to export some manufactured goods to Common Market countries without paying duty. The Soviet-Romanian talks also came against the backdrop of Romania's warm public praise for the "positive" value of the President's trip to Peking.*

In an apparently related development, Podgorny used the occasion of a ceremony in which he received the new ambassador from Romania on 29 February to discourse pointedly on the need for "socialist unity." According to the PRAVDA account of his remarks, Podgorny cited the need for "coordinated action" by the socialist states "to frustrate imperialism's aggressive plans." He also stressed, PRAVDA said, the need "for further extensive improvement of political and economic cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact organization and CEMA" and declared that "the implementation of the comprehensive program for socialist economic integration is particularly important in this respect."

Judging by the PRAVDA account, Romanian Ambassador Badrus made no reciprocal bow toward economic "integration" or the need for a "coordinated" foreign policy. He limited himself to a pledge of Romanian willingness for further "cooperation" with the Soviet Union and to praise of Soviet foreign policy as "a prominent factor" in the strengthening of world socialism and the pursuit of peace.

* See the TRENDS of 24 February, page 16, and 1 March, page 10, for summaries of Bucharest's reaction to the trip.

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Renewed Soviet unease over Romania's maverick behavior seemed reflected in an attack on "nationalist trends in socialist countries" by Bulgarian party chief Todor Zhivkov, a prominent proxy spokesman for Moscow. The article appeared in issue No. 3 of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM and was reprinted in the Bulgarian party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 1 March. Arguing that one's attitude toward the Soviet Union is the "touchstone of proletarian internationalism," Zhivkov said "it is no secret to anyone that grave nationalistic trends existed and still exist in some socialist countries--trends which not only provide favorable ground for the flourishing of right and leftwing revisionism and endanger the socialist victories of the working people and the socialist development of these countries, but also evolve into anti-Sovietism and undermine the unity and cohesion of the world socialist system." In language even more pointedly aimed at Romania, Zhivkov added that "attempts are being made within the world communist movement, under the cover of the correct thesis regarding the autonomy and equal rights of communist parties, to deprive proletarian internationalism of its content and meaning."

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COLLUSION CHARGED BETWEEN UKRAINE NATIONALISTS AND PEKING

Ukrainian newspaper articles released at the time of President Nixon's visit to China have accused Ukrainian nationalists residing in Western countries of forming a "dirty alliance" with the PRC. Article in RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 26 February and RABOCHAYA GAZETA on 27 February have alleged that the Ukrainian emigres desire a war between the USSR and China, in the hope that Soviet military efforts would be "disrupted" by non-Russians in the USSR, whose disintegration would thereby be assisted.

The Ukrainian nationalists and Peking as well were charged with quite specific activities to this end. RADYANSKA UKRAINA claimed that the Ukrainian emigre groups initiated the contacts by sending their anti-Soviet papers, books, and pamphlets to "all known addresses of state and public establishments" in China, "in hopes that the Chinese leaders would use these materials in fanning anti-Soviet hysteria." The Chinese, it was alleged, responded by buying up "a large quantity of anti-Soviet bourgeois nationalist literature" in Munich during 1970 and by conducting "special" negotiations with representatives of a Ukrainian nationalist group "on joint anti-Soviet action." In October 1971 a Ukrainian emigre leader allegedly traveled to Peking for the purpose of "establishing direct ties with those circles in the PRC which specialize in anti-Soviet subversive acts." Citing the Western press, the article also asserted that, in addition to broadcasts by Radio Peking, China is publishing a special bulletin in Ukrainian containing "provocative appeals to the Ukrainian people."

The parallel RABOCHAYA GAZETA article added other accusations. It said that Ukrainian nationalists are seeking to establish contacts with Chinese officials at the United Nations, trying to set up "direct personal contacts with Maoists in order to organize 'Ukrainian' radio broadcasts from China and other anti-Soviet actions," and scheming to persuade China to make Ukrainian independence "one of the key slogans" in the Chinese-Soviet conflict.

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Ukrainian emigres did take an interest in China following Peking's attacks on the USSR's nationality policy and reports of China's support for national communist circles in the Ukraine. A December 1971 article in the Ukrainian emigre journal SUCHASNIST indicates, however, that Ukrainian emigres remain divided on the propriety of cooperating with China.

MZHAVANADZE PROTEGE ATTACKED BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

A recent CPSU Central Committee decree criticizing the Tbilisi city party committee for a wide range of shortcomings comes close to being a public rebuke for Georgian First Secretary and Politburo candidate member Vasilii Mzhavanadze. Although the direct target of the decree is the Tbilisi city first secretary, Otar Lolashvili, Mzhavanadze is clearly involved: the Tbilisi organization is by far the largest in Georgia and certainly comes under Mzhavanadze's close supervision, and Lolashvili himself has worked directly with Mzhavanadze for the last 10 years. Mzhavanadze selected the 38-year old Lolashvili to head the Georgian Central Committee's administrative organs section in 1962. He quickly moved up to the post of Tbilisi second secretary in October 1963 and to first secretary in April 1965, also becoming a candidate member of the Georgian Central Committee bureau in 1966 and a full member in 1971.

In February or early March of this year Lolashvili was called to the CPSU Central Committee to report on his city committee's work. Now a Central Committee decree published on 6 March condemns his organization for shortcomings in organizational and ideological work, in industry, construction, and trade, and in the struggle against embezzlement. The decree lectures the Georgians on the need to improve ideological education, the quality of party members, and the observance of party norms, as well as on the necessity of eliminating "liberalism" in cadre work.

Such criticism must be a bitter pill for Mzhavanadze, who has long stressed the themes of discipline, ideological purity, and careful screening of prospective new party members. Mzhavanadze's coolness toward Brezhnev has often been evident in his speeches in recent years, and he appeared to suffer a setback at the party congress in 1971 when despite his seniority he was listed last among candidate members by Brezhnev.

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CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CIVIL POLICE FORCES ATTRACT SOME FAVORABLE PUBLICITY

PRC media have recently carried a few unusual items of a public-relations nature on the police forces--few in number, but the first of their kind for sometime. NCNA transmitted domestically on 24 February reports on good deeds of the Peking police in searching for missing family members, returning lost property, and rescuing children from drowning. On 3 March, the Chekiang provincial radio broadcast similar reports on police rescues and services to ill persons.

The popularization campaign, if it proves to be such, follows the disengagement of the PLA from public security functions and presumably is intended to raise the prestige of the civilian security organs. During the cultural revolution there were few mentions of the police forces which were often closely associated with the old order. PLA troops assumed supervision over public security and for a time were assisted by ad hoc groups such as the various "provost corps" which maintained order under PLA leadership. The more recent rebuilding of a professional security force has been accorded little media attention up to this time.

A 24 February Tsinghai radio report on a study session held by the provincial security, procuratorial, and judicial department delved into more substantive issues. The party committee of the department attacked such "swindler" theories as "the rejection of party leadership." Now more than ever, the committee declared, it asks for instructions from and reports to higher levels, "placing public security work under the absolute leadership of the party." The emphasis on party control seems to be a lightly veiled attack on the previous PLA administration.

The Tsinghai report indicates that current efforts are being aimed at centralizing control over security policies. Some notice was paid to basic units and to the principle of democratic centralism, but the report clearly showed that decisions must come from high-level party organs. And while the party itself may still call for open sessions with mass participation, there was no mention in the Tsinghai report of a mass voice in public security. The report noted that during the "one blow and three oppositions" campaign some units tried to initiate policies and asked the provincial organ to do away with certain conventions called for by the party, but these units were educated to see that party policies must be followed in all areas.

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